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1. INTRODUCTION1
The objective of this document is to contribute to an
analysis of the prices in Mozambican agriculture with a view to
improve the knowledge of this very important area of agricultural
economics and to arrive at better informed and more consistent
policy decisions. The document does not pretend to cover all
aspects at the same level of detail. However, it is the intention
to provide a general framework, synthesizing the existing
information and experience in order to focus on some topics of
particular importance in the present phase of rehabilitating the
economy of Mozambique. The document is organized in three main
parts: the first gives a general framework, the second analyses
price developments between 1976 and 1986, and the third reviews
topics of priority importance in the formulation of the price
policy for the future.
The weak performance of African AgricUlture in the last two
decades, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, has already been
the ob~ect of various studies, reports and international
meetings. It is indeed indisputable that a profound crisis
exists, which requires concerted measures and action on behalf of
the African countries as well as the international commodity to
be overcome.
There is a general consensus that a continuation of trends
observed in the past is not viable and that adequate measures
must be taken. However, which are the measures to be taken? The
reasons for the present crisis are many, and there is no general
consensus about which reasons are of primary and determining
nature and which are of only secundary importance.
The World Bank (1981) identifies insufficiencies
agriCUltural policies of the African countries as the
and proposes a strategy for agriCUltural growth
important elements are:
in internal
main factor
whose most
I This document was elaborated by Finn Tarp,
MacroeconomistjAgr. Planner and Teamleader of project MOZj86j007,
with assistance from Vitoria da Silva Pereira,
EconomistjCooperant of the same project. The assistance of Clive
Williams in the analysis of price developments is acknOWledged.
2 It is sufficient to mention here that the increase
between 1970 and 1984 of per capita food crop production was
negative in the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, it was not just food production that declined. The
same accounts for export products. Therefore, what is in
reference is a profound crisis of the agricultural sector as a
whole (see WB 1981, FAO 1980 and 1986).
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- concentration of resources on smallholders and export
crops.
- Reform of incentive structures to ensure better prices.
- More open and competitive marketing systems.
- Better availability of consumer goods.
The WB underlines the importance of external assistance but
also indicates that:
"African Governments, therefore, must be willing to take
firm action on internal problems, be more open to proposals
to revise policies in the light of experience, and be
willing to accept the preposition that without policy reform
higher aid will be difficult to mobilize" (WB 1981, p.8).
The proposals of the WB have created an intensive debate.
Mkandawire (1982) classifies these proposals as a "package of
delicately prepared proposals to facilitate capitalist
penetration in the African economies and in particular in the
agricul tural sector". He also observes that there is a serious
conflict between these proposals and the objectives of the Lagos
Plan of Action3 , which focus on selfsUfficiency in food as a
priority objective.
The Nordic countries (1984, p.3) state that "negligence of
the incentive framework is the single most important reason why
marketed agricultural production has declined". This view is
therefore along the line of the WB position. In other aspects
Nordic opinions focus more on the importance of food
selfsUfficiency in accordance with Lagos Plan of Action. A
critique of the Nordic position as well as the analysis of the WB
is that they do not take sUfficiently into consideration
important exogenous factors as the World economic crisis and in
the case of Southern Africa the destabilization policy of South
Africa.
The collaboration between Frelimo and the Nordic countries
goes far back, and Mozambique entered the WB and the IMF in 1984,
the same year the Nkomati Accord was signed and the external debt
was renegotiated for the first time. In the following years South
African aggression did not stop, the economic crisis deepened and
to confront this situation the Economic Rehabilitation Programme
(PRE) was prepared. PRE identifies the socio-economic
destabilization as well as other exogenous factors as the
fundamental reasons for the present crisis of Mozambique.
3 Approved by the Heads of State of DAU in Lagos in 1980.
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However, "there are also other causes of an internal nature
which, although they are not determining, become important when
they are combined with external causes. We are referring to the
problems of organizing the management of the economy" (speech by
Prime Minister Mario Machungo in the People's General Assembly,
January 1987). Therefore, the Frelimo Party and the Government
decided to introduce changes in the economic policy of the
country, including the area of price policy. However, "it's all
very well to agree that we've got to get the prices right', but
how does one discover what the right prices are?,,4
2. PRICE POLICY FORMULATION
2.1. General Framework: Theoretical Observations
2.1.1. The Politic-Economic Organization of Society and Prices
The establishment of the material and ideological basis for
a socialist society is included among the main objectives of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique. It is
through State control of the economy this basis with new
relations of production is to be established.
The State controls the economy directly through production
and investment plans, as well as through indirect measures as
control over prices, salaries etc. It is in this way that the
socio-economic life of the country develops within the framework
of a centrally planned economy, which is also characterized by
State ownership of the land, of financial institutions, of health
and education, as well as of production enterprises etc.
These facts have implications for the analysis and
formulation of the price policy, but price policies are as
important for countries with central planning as for countries
more oriented towards the market. If an efficient price policy
and effective control of markets do not exist there are no
possibilities to determine and control economic development.
"Marx thought that with the liquidation of the capitalist
mode of production and the sUbstitution of private property of
the means of production by social ownership, the conditions which
gives production its commodity nature would disappear and instead
of production of commodities (to be sold in the market) planned
production in accordance with the needs of society and its
members would immediately begin" (Ministry of Finance, 1985,
document II pp. 2-3). It would seem that this viewpoint of Marx
4 This comment was made by Mr. M. Faber, Director of the
Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex in
its 1986 Annual Report.
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was linked to the perspective of technological advances, to be
realized during the capitalist phase, would have removed the
production constraints before arriving at the socialist phase.
Marx did not, therefore, elaborate a price theory which serves as
a practical basis in a socialist country like Mozambique where
the production constraints are of critical importance, a country
where economic calculation, and the need to take rational choices
etc. form part of the day-to-day socio-economic life as well as
in the planning of the future. The experiences of the soviet
union as well as other countries like Cuba clearly demonstrates
the complexities of developing a relevant price theory and
establish an appropriate price structure.
However, there is of course a close link between theory and
practice, and the real question is: "What role should be played
by what theorists call 'commodity-money relations' in a soviet
type system?" (Nove, 1983 p.98). Another way of putting this is
to note that "in a socialist society there is no spontaneous
'movement' of prices. They are planned by the State. The average
cost for the sector to which is added a certain markup serves as
a basis for the planning of prices" (Ministry of Finance, 1985,
document II p. 12). However, how is it that planners can
determine the use-value of a product in the present phase, where
the question of production has not been resolved, without
involving the users directly in the process?
Linked to the debate of prices in socialist countries there
are fundamental issues of the applicability and relevance of
Marxist value theory and this debate continues!
It is in this way that reformists argue that a reform, which
introduces more flexibility, where the economic system is
decentralized and where managers are allowed to make choices
regarding the composition of products and the purchase of inputs,
also requires prices based on demand and supply.
It is stressed that what was said above should not be
interpreted as an argument against any kind of price control. It
1S, however, impossible in the present phase to control all
prices without creating a series of unwanted anomalities, and
some of these are created because the producer and the consumer
cannot negotiate a price appropriate to the circumstances of the
case. The Polish economist Kalecki once observed that "the
stupidiest thing to do is not to calculate; the second most
stupid thin~ to do is to follow blindly the result of one's
calculation" , and the prices of demand and supply, in a more
decentralized situation do transmit important information to
producers of the urgency and importance of the demand.
5 The citation made here comes from Nove (1983, p.99).
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However, it is globally recognized, and general practice
that Governments need to intervene in the price formation of
agricultural products.
2.1.2. The Development strategy and Prices
The price policy is as already indicated defined within the
political-economical system of the country and it also reflects
aspects of the development strategy and its theoretical basis.
Two view20ints which are fundamentally different may be
identified6 .
The first has as its basis that prices should be kept low to
facilitate the transfer of resources to the urban/industrial
sector. Reference may be made to models as those of Arthur Lewis
(1954) or theories which imply that primitive accumulation must
be made "at the back of the peasants".
The second viewpoint is that prices are a critical factor in
the decisions of the peasants. In other words the elasticity of
production in regard to prices is significant. This view is often
characterized as the neoclassical position.
In addition there exist various combinations of these two
distinct points of view.
2.1.3. Specific Objectives and Measures
What was said above is in practice related to a large number
of specific objectives. In accordance with FAO (1984) these
objectives are often not made explicit by African Governments but
can be summarized in the following way, distinguishing between
food and cash crops (FAO, 1986):
Food Crops
- Stability of producer prices at a relatively low level.
- Provision of incentives for increased production to
improve the selfsufficiency of the country.
- Guaranteed and stable prices and income levels.
- Improvement of nutrition.
6 See Timmer (1980)
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Cash Crops
- Raising government revenue.
- Increasing export earnings through increasing production.
- Price stability and stable income levels.
- Import sUbstitution.
Common for the two groups are objectives like:
- Promotion of specific forms of production and socio-
economic reorganization and transformation.
- Ensuring input supplies for the national industry.
- Improving rural incomes and other income distribution
considerations.
The concrete policy measures may affect prices directly or
indirectly. Measures which affect prices directly include in
particular fixed producer and/or consumer prices and prices
conditioned through marketing margins or fixed profit markups.
Minimum and maximum prices also affect the price structure
directly.
Among indirect measures reference may in the first place be
made to stabilization funds, subsidies and taxes at various
levels (producer, consumer or inputs), quantitative export and
import restrictions, supply and demand controls of the national
market as rationing systems, food aid, the exchange rate and
other aspects of macroeconomic policy.
In addition, the systems for production, marketing and
processing as well as export and import vary among the various
crops and are indirectly affecting the price structure.
The list and the comments made above together with the
limited number of available policy instruments easily explain why
situations occur where it seems that the Government is pursuing
conflicting objectives through the same instrument.
2.2. General Framework: Mozambiaue
2.2.1. The Pre-Independence Period until 1974
It is interesting to observe that the Portuguese colonialist
state pursued a very interventionistic price policy in
Mozambique. The then Colony of Mozambique produced and supplied
6
raw materials at very low prices to the Portuguese industry (as
for example cotton) and guaranteed a protected and safe market at
favourable prices for the industrial production of Portugal. An
example which is well focussed on in the Report of the Central
Committee to the Fourth Congress (Frelimo 1983, pp. 10-11) is
that in 1961 the price of textiles produced in Portugal (with
cotton from Mozambique) could be up to more than 40 times the
price of the raw material produced in Mozambique.
Price controls were well established and included
agricUltural crops as maize, rice, wheat, soybean, cashew and
groundnut. In the case of maize, for example, the purchase price
was differentiated among 18 locations. The legal diploma no. 6/73
in its article 6.1 indicates that "price control may include any
product II • In the case of agricultural and livestock products,
controls were to be established after joint study by the
marketing services and the services or organisms which supervised
production. The setting of maximum prices and maximum profit
rates was also foreseen in the DL 6/73 at very favourable levels
under normal circumstances.
Before Independence the cow~ercial network was in the hands
of the private sector. There was a difference between the
marketing structure of export crops and for crops for internal
consumption resulting from the different production structures.
The system may be reviewed as follows:
- The marketing of the majority of export crops was made by
companies or associations which grew these crops in plantations
and processed them in their factories. This was for example the
case for sugar, tea, sisal and copra (not including copra of the
family sector which was marketed through private traders to the
oil industry).
- Cotton and cashew were exported under Government control
by the processing companies, but the purchase of seed cotton
grown by the peasant sector was organized by the factories, and
the cashew was purchased by private traders before being sold.
- Other crops produced for internal consumption such as food
and oil crops as well as fruits and vegetables grown by the
peasant sector and private settlers were marketed through the
system of private traders ("cantineiros") who also sold consumer
goods and agricUltural inputs.
with Independence the need to restructure the price system,
introduce new institutions and define clearly the objectives to
be realized appeared. It was, however, nothing new that the
Government as such intervened directly in the process of price
formation.
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2.2.2. The Transition Period and Independence (1974-77)7
This period is characterized in the economic field by the
struggle against sabotage and a crisis of under-utilization of
the productive capacity of the enterprises. This period therefore
witnessed a substantial increase in production costs to the point
where the value of production was insufficient to cover the costs
which implied deficits in the enterprises. In this context the
state appeared - through the Central Bank - as a subsidizer of
these deficits (through credits which were not repayed),
postponing to future years the preoccupation of improving
productivity, reducing unit costs of production and initiating a
financial review of the enterprises.
The existing commercial network for the family sector
collapsed at Independence with the exodus of the "cantineiros"
and also the marketing system for export crops was heavily
affected. It became necessary to establish quickly new
structures. It was against this background that the National
Directorate of Economy and Marketing (DINECA) was created in the
Ministry of Agriculture with responsibility for the purchase,
storage and marketing of family sector crops, and the people's
shops were established for the distribution of consumer goods.
For export crops a National Company for Mozambican Marketing
(ENACOMO) was created, originally responsible for export of all
export crops.
A process of establishing a series of state enterprises for
import and distribution of agricultural inputs (Interquimica and
Boror, respectively), livestock marketing (GAPECOM), marketing of
fruits and vegetables (Hortifruticola) etc. was also initiated.
In addition state enterprises were necessary in the production
sector to take care of the plantations and fields left by the
colonialists.
2.2.3. The Third Congress and the Following Years (1977-83)
From the Third Congress of Frelimo held in 1977 the general
outline of the economic policy of the country appears more
clearly, and particular attention was given to prices as an
integral element of this policy.
The Third Congress in its Socio-Economic Directives
(Frelimo, 1977) defined that the measures detailed below should
be implemented:
7 The exposition here is partly based on document I of
the Ministry of Finance (1985)
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- setting of prices at central level with priority for basic
products and the carrying out of studies to ensure
uniformity of prices at national level.
- creation of a national coordinating organ for supplies.
- Establishment of new marketing margins taking into
consideration the interests of the working class, and fixing
the share destined for the state in the form of taxes.
- Creation during 1978 of a National Commission of Prices.
It was also defined that "private trade is permitted ... but
its practices should be SUbjected to regulation" (Frelimo, 1977
p. 64) •
The Third Congress and the consequent legislation therefore
identify as important objectives8 :
- Broad participation by state organs in
transformation of the economy of the
democratic centralism and utilizing
instrument the policy of prices.
the direction and
country based on
as an important
- Prices should be used as an incentive for producers to
increase production, to redistribute the national income in
favour of the most disadvantaged groups (workers and
peasants) and to improve the levels of consumption of the
economy and the people.
8 Legislation of a fundamental character include in
particular:
- Resolution no. 20/79 of the People's Assembly which
determines that it is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance to centralize and organize all work
in the field of prices.
- Decrees 10 and 11/82 which determine the intervention
of the state in prices and define tasks and
responsibilities of the different structures of the
state in relation to prices.
- Resolutions 1 and 2/82 of CNSP about ways of
publishing, fixing and conditioning prices.
- Internal resolution 1/82 of the Council of Ministers
about price policy.
In addition it may
conditioning of prices the
used.
be noted that in relation to the
norms contained in DL 6/73 have been
9
- Stability and uniformity at national level (or in case
this not being possible at provincial level) of prices of
products of primary necessity, considering subsidies for
some of these products and avoiding big increases in the
general price level.
- Priority to the agriCUltural sector and external trade.
- Prices as an
control over
accumUlation.
important means
a significant
of the State
part of the
to obtain
national
The institutional structure which was established include in
the first place the National Commission for Salaries and Prices
(CNSP), organ of the Council of Ministers headed by the Minister
of Finance. In the various Ministries of the economic sphere
departments of prices were created with the task of directing and
organizing all work on prices and the analysis of proposals for
altering, setting and controlling prices. In the case of the
Ministry of Agriculture this responsibility was assigned the
National Directorate of Agricultural Economy (DNEA).
It is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance to
organize and centralize all price work. The respective branch
Ministries and their departments of prices as well as Provincial
Governments follow methodologies defined by the Ministry of
Finance and global orientations from the National Planning
Commission (CNP).
The state intervenes directly in the price formation system
through:
- Setting of prices (at various levels of production and
marketing).
Conditioning of prices set by enterprises.
- Authorizing free price formation.
Decree 10/82 lists the 45 products whose prices were fixed
at central level until 1987. They include the main agriCUltural
products for internal consumption and export as well as
agriCUltural inputs. The Council of Ministers fixes the prices of
electric energy, hydro-carbides, petrol, diesel and housing. The
setting at central level of other prices and the definition of
norms for the conditioning of prices is the responsibility of
CNSP. The CNSP defines the various producer and consumer prices
on the basis of proposals which in the case of the agriculture
sector in particular involve the Ministries of Agriculture and
Commerce.
Article 4.1 of decree 10/82 establishes that each Ministry
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determines the prices of other goods and services to be used by
enterprises or units under their responsibility, a responsibility
which may be delegated to the Provincial Governors or the
Presidents of Executive City councils.
The majority of prices which were not fixed were conditioned
and the norms of conditioning included the following aspects in
relation to which some of the norms contained in DL 6/76 continue
to be applied (although not effectively controlled):
- The methodology for cost calculation on which prices are
based.
- The maximum profit margin.
- The maximum marketing margin.
The margins established fluctuate at wholesaler level
between 10 and 25% and at retail level between 20 and 45%.
The Ministry of Finance is also responsible for fixing or
determining the setting of taxes, tariffs and other differentials
for all products and services and for determining the price
subsidies to be granted.
In 1978 responsibility for agricultural marketing was
transferred from DINECA to the Ministry of Internal Commerce
where a National Directorate of Agricultural Marketing (DNCA) was
created. with a view to promoting private trade a Law of Private
Trade was approved in 1979, and in 1980 the People's Shops were
abolished.
In 1980 a state enterprise Agricom was created in the field
of agricultural marketing which assumed responsibility for buying
from the family sector and distribution/sale of consumergoods to
this sector9 .
The medium-long term objective is to reestablish at local
level a network of private and cooperative traders who maintain
direct commercial relations with the peasants. Agricom should
operate mainly at wholesaler level buying from traders (and
whenever necessary from state enterprises on an exceptional
basis), organizing storage, transport etc. However, in the
initial phase Agricom assumed an important role in direct
purchasing from the peasants due to the non-existence of a
9 Agricom is responsible for family sector marketing of
the following crops: maize, unhusked rice, sorghum, wheat,
cassava, potato, sweet potato, soybean, beans, groundnut , sesame,
sunflower, copra, mafurra, cashew and various other crops. See
Tickner (1985)
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private network.
In the case of cotton marketing responsibility was
transferred to the Secretariat of State for Cotton (SEA) and in
the case of other industrial crops like tea, sugar and copra from
the plantations it can be noted that they are grown in direct
connection with processing facilities.
The 1977-83 period therefore witnessed the creation of new
structures at central level and the introduction of new
legislation over prices and marketing. This period after some
years of progress until 1982 also marks the start of the
worsening of economic problems, resulting in the first place from
South Africa's destabilization activities and a series of natural
calamities. The lack of consumer goods made itself felt,
enterprise deficits returned to their increasing trend and black
marketeering increased considerably, and a general ized lack of
confidence in the currency could be verified.
It may also be underlined that the political economy pursued
in general during this period paid little attention to the role
of ' commodity-money relations'. Central planning based itself
excessively 1n quantitative planning with centrally fixed
targets. It was complicated to introduce alterations in prices
and adequate attention was not paid to the fact that macro-
economic variables indirectly affect the possibilities of the
State to maintain a structure with fixed prices.
2.2.4. The Fourth Congress and the Following Years (1983-87)
The Fourth Congress of 1983 made a critical analysis of the
results obtained since the Third Congress and underlined the need
to give priority to the family sector, reorganize the state
sector and reinforce the role of the private sector in production
and trade. The report of the Central Committee to the Congress
(Frelimo, 1983) specifies that the price policy should stimulate
the production of products marketed by the family, cooperative
and private sectors. It should also promote productivity in the
factories linking prices to normal costs of production and
increasing efficiency. Finally, prices should be conceived as a
stimulating factor for the reestablishment of the market in the
economy.
The Fourth Congress also decided that the Government should
initiate a process of decentralization of the planning system and
methods of decision making and prepare an economic programme for
the years 1984-86. This programme became the basis for
negotiations in 1984 with the Paris Clube over the external
debt10 . Subsequently a number of economic measures were taken. A
10 See CNP (1984).
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new system for the management of foreign currency was introduced,
and a delegation of responsibility from ENACOMO was initiated to
some of the factories or processing companies for crops such as
cotton, cashew and tea. The role of the private sector in
marketing was promoted, a revision of centrally fixed prices
including considerable increases in producer and consumer prices
took place, and prices of vegetables, fruits, onions, sweet
potato, cassava, ducks, rabbits and turkeys were liberalized.
Competence was also delegated to Provincial Governments as far as
price setting of potato, goat, sheep and fresh fish (within
certain maximum and minimum levels) is concerned11
However, the crisis continued to deepen. The macroeconomic
indices arrived at very low levels. Family sector marketing
diminished continuously. The enterprises involved in agricultural
production and marketing accumulated huge obligations. The
development of a private commercial network stopped. Finally, the
rural sector lost its (relative) self-sufficiency and became more
and more dependent on food aid with a large number of affected
and displaced people.
To confront this situation a Programme of Economic
Rehabilitation (PRE) covering the period 1987-90 was elaborated
towards the end of 198612 . This programme contains a large number
of measures to stop the fall in the economic activity of the
country and initiate a progressive recuperation. In the area of
price policy the following objectives were specified by the Prime
Minister Mario Machungo in his speech to the popular Assembly in
the beginning of 1987.
- Make profitable the majority of agricultural industrial,
transport and construction enterprises taking into
consideration present levels of capacity utilization, of
work productivity and rationality in management.
- stimulate marketed production from the family sector and
from small and medium private agricultural producers.
- Eliminate or sUbstantially reduce the financial
disequilibrium existing between demand (expressed in
monetary terms) and supply (at legal prices) of goods and
services to the population.
- Hinder any significant fall in the real value of salaries
and income of family sector peasants.
The PRE does not foresee the introduction of new
11
12
See resolution 1/85 of CNSP.
See RPM (1987) and Frelimo (1987).
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institutions in the pn.cJ.ng system which remains as explained
above. It is, however, foreseen that:
- Bureacratic and administrative procedures
management and in the determination of prices
will be eliminated.
in economic
and salaries
- Producer prices will become an instrument for promotion of
surplus and the combat of black markets13 .
- The role of price and credit policies as well as other
indirect measures for distributing resources will be
increased instead of direct administrative intervention.
More concretely it is foreseen that:
- All products with fixed prices will have them adjusted to
reflect the real cost of resources and to take the recent
devaluations fUlly into account.
- The number of products with fixed prices will be reduced
from 45 to 30 until the beginning of 1988 with additional
reductions later on. Some of these products will have their
prices conditioned, others will be liberalized14 .
- Some products on the fixed price list will continue to
have prJ.ces fixed at all levels of production, but others
will only be fixed at the consumer level.
- In the case of conditioned prices directors of enterprises
will be free to modify them according to established norms
and it is foreseen to do away gradually with conditioned
prices when competition and supply improve.
- Subsidies will be given to some basic goods and services.
13 The Prime Minister (Machungo, 1987) notes: "The price
policy should drain the actual flow of exaggerated and
illicit profits to the pockets of black marketeers. For this the
state will continue to use administrative mechanisms, but it is
above all by economic means that the struggle against black
markets should be fought". This signals a modified attitude to
this problem. Previously slogans like "death over the black
marketeers" were common.
14 The CNSP already decided that the prices of some
products including eggs, tea, wheat, and fertilizers can be
established by the respective production companies on the basis
of production costs, being in the area of marketing subject to DL
6/73. Five more products will be transferred to the list of
conditioned products before end of 1987.
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For the family sector the state will take measures to define
the producer prices taking into consideration its importance for
the national economy and the real prices of goods and services
provided to the sector. It is also foreseen to use international
prices at the official exchange rate and adjusted for internal
costs of distribution and processing as a guide when setting
producer prices in the agricultural sector.
That is, the Government and the Party through PRE confirm
the complexity of establishing an effective price policy. It is
necessary to take into consideration the following points:
1. There is an indirect relationship between the state
budget and the prices which goes beyond the use of prices as an
accounting unit or measure of the value of a product. If for
example state enterprises in the field of production or marketing
accumulate big deficits Which are automatically covered by the
state, dangerous financial disequilibria easily develop. The
funds of the Government are limited and such a situation
therefore puts at risk social objectives and produces an excess
demand which provokes parallel markets over which the Government
has no effective control.
2. The loss of control over the markets of the economy puts
at risk the possibility of the Government to direct the economy
effectively. It becomes difficult, for example, for the state to
collect value added taxes and procure products. Therefore,
suppressing private activity does not seem viable, it is better
to recognize it and control it as required.
3. Incentives for producers are important. Producers respond
to prices and other incentives when it is technologically
possible, but not to administrative directives. It therefore
becomes important to analyse the indirect implications of the
exchange rate policy, the terms of trade between industry and
agriculture, the availability of consumer goods etc.
4. There is a conflict between the need to have prices which
incentivate production and the need for low prices of
consumption. Subsidies (to the producer and/or producer) may be
justified, but they are expensive, and their effects should be
carefully analysed before being introduced. One cannot consume
what one does not produce.
PRE therefore signals a much more important role to be given
to 'commodity-money' relations, a less ambitious price setting
system, more in-depth analysis of the relations between price
policy and general macroeconomic policy etc.
The big challenge and fundamental question which the country
faces is how to advance in practice with the process of
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decentralization and price reforms under existing circumstances,
maintaining at the same time the principles and fundamental
objectives of planning and centrally directed and controlled
development.
2.3. criteria for Price Setting
It has already been mentioned that it is globally recognized
and general practice that Governments intervene in the price
setting mechanisms for agricultural crops (at the level of the
producer and the consumer, as well as in relation to inputs).
However, the criteria for setting prices are not always clearly
documented and there is no general agreement on what the criteria
should be. In countries where systematic work in relation to
producer prices was carried out the main criteria would appear to
be (FAO, 1984):
- Costs of production.
- The establishment of producer prices derived from
desirable consumer prices.
- Projected international prices.
In the case of Mozambique the terms of trade between a given
agricultural product and the goods in the basket of the Ministry
of Commerce have also been used.
Often the real basis for direct intervention in the prices
is a mixture of these criteria and there are various examples of
differences between the official methodology and the practice
followed. It is, for example, difficult to find in sub-Saharan
Africa countries where producer prices are automatically adjusted
upwards in case of cost increases15 .
The cost of production criteria is the most widely used all
over the World and in the case of Mozambique the price proposals
prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture are calculated on basis
of cost of production in commercial enterprises. Costs of
production are in turn calculated on technological norms for the
crops in question. Estimated prices for the family sector are
calculated from the above data, and this obviously implies a big
margin of error given that the production conditions are
fundamentallly different. This risk is further worsened when
prices are fixed at national level as well.
15 It must be recalled here that the major cost
smallholders is the implicit cost of family labour, where a
relevant criteria would be income per work unit.
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for
more
The basic problem of this methodology is that the producer
does not receive through the price a signal of the urgency and
importance of the demand; a signal which could imply that he
would change the level or composition of his production. The
advantage of the cost of production criteria is that it provides
a guarantee for the producer against significant price drops.
Under normal conditions costs are covered and in case of
productivity increases possibilities for increased profits exist.
For the planners it is a criteria which is easy to use, and there
is always a certain flexibility given that there may be various
interpretations of the cost level.
The establishment of producer prices based on desirable
consumer prices reflect the interests of the consumer in the
process. There is no doubt that this criteria has had in other
countries of sub-Saharan Africa as well as in Mozambique a big
impact in price interventions. The danger of this criteria is the
fact that one cannot consume what is not produced16 . The inverse
relationship (in the absence of sUbsidies) with the producer
price and the marketing and profit margins is important.
The criteria of international prices has not been very much
used in Mozambique to date, although it is a criteria which is
very much used in other countries, in particular with reference
to export crops. The World Bank has also in the case of
Mozambique insisted on the introduction of this criteria. The
justification given is that international prices offer a measure
of opportunity costs; and it is an already established experience
that it is impossible to maintain prices far from the level in
neighbouring countries without seeing goods crossing the
frontiers.
The basic problems of this criteria is that international
prices fluctuate widely and that the international market is a
residual market which does not in a given moment necessarily
reflect long term trends17 . In addition, subsidies in the
industrialized countries have for example created excesses in the
case of food grains which means that international prices do not
reflect in fact real opportunity costs. This last fact is
16 This formUlation is obviously somewhat simplistic, but
it is understood that a country cannot consume what it does not
produce or obtain through trade or donations/credits.
17 It should be mentioned here that for an importing
country the relevant price is the elF price plus transport and
marketing costs to point of processing (or wholesale) minus
transport costs of locally produced goods. For an exporting
country the relevant price at producer level is the FOB export
price minus marketing and transport costs between point of
production and the port.
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particularly important for a country where selfsUfficiency in
food is a strategic objective.
The utilization of the terms of trade reflects a correct
preoccupation with the interests of the peasant as an individual
who is producer and consumer as well. However, it must be
underlined that this type of analysis without use of global
indices is partial and in fact may be classified as an analysis
of direct barter product by product. It therefore cannot be used
alone without also analysing relative costs of production. That
is, it is not only the relative price in comparison with the
price of consumer goods which affect production. It is also
necessary to analyse direct and opportunity costs of production.
Reference was already made to the objective of maintaining
prices stable and uniform at national level and undOUbtedly these
two objectives were given much importance since Independence. It
is correct that without stability at least during the on-going
year planning becomes very much more difficult and producers (as
well as consumers) become SUbjected to a series of nondesirable
and unforeseen influences. It is, however, necessary to analyse
well which products to stabilize and for how long because
stability also implies inflexibility and lack of adoption to new
conditions and economic possibilities. The measures to take have
a cost and the point is reached where it for other objectives
becomes necessary to change emphasis.
Uniform prices at national level has social and political
importance and it also has administrative advantages to treat
consumers and producers in various parts of the country equally.
The consequent distortion in the use of resources may, however,
be considerable when producers do not take account of transport
costs which have to be paid by someone. Transport costs may
increase substantially in case of products which are difficult to
transport or in case of distant regions. When it is a state
company (as Agricom) which has the marketing responsibility in
these situations an economic-financial disadvantage of
considerable magnitUde is encountered as compared to private
traders who concentrate their efforts on more lucrative areas.
Therefore, the use of uniform prices imply a certain cost, and it
should be well analysed which products to include and at which
geographic level.
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3. PRICE DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1976 AND 1986
3.1. Presentation
For this study the developments between 1976 and 1986 of the
prices of eight agricultural products with a strategic importance
for the family sector were analysed. The products included are on
the one side maize, rice, beans, (type II) and groundnut (that is
four food crops) and on the other side cotton, cashew, copra and
sunflower (that is four industrial crops with export potential).
The period from 1976 to 1981 was chosen to analyse agricultural
price trends in Mozambique since Independence. The year of 1976
is the first full year after Independence and 1986 is the last
year comparable with previous years due to the measures of PRE
which makes it difficult to make a similar analysis including
1987 as well.
The following data were collected:
- Nominal producer prices for all the crops.
Nominal consumer prices for all the food crops.
- Nominal prices at factory gate or warehouse for industrial
crops as well as their export value after processing.
It must be stressed that for the products where prices were
set during the whole of the 1976-86 period sources are not
completely coherent. It therefore was in some cases necessary to
include information of a qualitative nature before estimating the
exact price level.
To estimate the development of real prices the consumer
price index of CNP was used l8 . The choice of this index is very
convenient as it covers exactly the period under analysis and
also includes estimates of the influence of the black market. It
is therefore the best overall index of consumer price
developments. Yet, it is obvious that the use of this index is
problematic, because the size of the black market is not known
due to its illegal nature and due so the practical problems
related to data collection. On the other hand, it is interesting
to note that a comparison with other possible indices (to deflate
the observed nominal trends) do not imply very different real
18 See DNE (1985) and DNE (1987).
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trends19 .
It is obvious that a comparison with the prices of the
basket of goods sold to the peasants is another way of
discovering real price tendencies. The disadvantage of this
methodology is that only partial conclusions, product by product
in comparison with the individual consumer goods can be a drawn.
However, the conclusions of this study appear in general in
accordance with studies based on partial consumer basket
comparisons20 .
In addition to analysing real prices (that is, the trends in
the terms of trade between producer and consumer prices) a
comparison of the development in the average wage (calculated as
explained in section 3.4) and producer prices was also
elaborated. It must be remembered in this context that producer
prices do not correspond directly to producer incomes given that
there are input costs. However, these costs are of minor
importance in this analysis given that the peasants between 1976
and 1986 did not buy, in general, improved inputs and used only
very simple non-mechanized tools. It was therefore assumed that
this aspect does not affect SUbstantially the relationship
between family sector and wage labour incomes (who are mainly
urban labourers). However, it is clear that the drop in marketed
quantities affected family sector incomes directly.
For the analysis of the relationship
marketing, data on total national marketing
under analysis were also used.
between prices and
of the eight crops
19 See the followinq comparison:
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Consumer price
index (total) 100 101 103 104 106 107 109 129 165 216 278 325
Consumer price
index (non food
products) 100 100 101 101 102 102 102 116 154 212 244 291
GOP deflator 100 96.7 81.5 68.4 56.3 38.5
For information on these indices see ONE (1985 and 1987) •
Infonnation on the GDP deflator made <!Ivailable in personal
communication.
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trousers,
paraffin,
This basket includes grown sugar, bicycles, canvas
cutlas~es, blankets, hoes, machettes, axes, edible oil,
batter~es, radios, soap, salt and cloth.
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As already indicated the crops were divided into two groups,
food crops and industrial crops (with export potential). The
reasons for this distinction are the following:
- Food crops are marketed at producer and consumer level in
the same form (that is in grain or with very little processing).
The difference between the consumer price (without subsidies) and
the producer price mainly consists of packaging, transport and
storage costs and profits without physical transformation of the
product.
- Industrial crops are not marketed at producer and consumer
levels in the same form. Physical processing is indispensable for
the product to have use value. Therefore, the difference between
the two levels of prices include in addition to marketing costs
and profits also processing costs (including physical losses
during processing).
3.2. Producer Prices
3.2.1. Food Crops
Table 1 and figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Annex 1 show the
development of nominal producer and consumer prices for maize,
rice, beans (type II) and groundnut between 1976 and 1986.
It is noticab1e that prices remained in fact very stable at
both levels and that the difference between the consumer and
producer price became negative in Maputo and Beira for maize and
rice in 1985, with the significant increases in producer prices
and the subsidies in these two cities, and given that the
consumer price did not increase. For groundnut and beans as well
as for maize and rice outside Maputo and Beira, the difference
between the two prices show an increasing tendency. In other
words, Government accepted an increase in the marketing and
profit margin over this period.
The stability of the producer price is as already referred
important during the ongoing year. However, it is not essential
to maintain prices stable from one year to the coming year(s)
given that these crops are annual. The stability for extended
periods, in particular in the beginning of the 1976-1986 period,
can probably be attributed to the limited importance given to
'commodity-money' relations and to administrative-analytic
difficulties in reviewing annualy the whole price system.
As can be seen from table 1 and figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 in
Annex 1 which show the developments in real prices, the stability
in nominal prices did not until 1981 result in any significant
drop in real prices due to the low inflation rate. From 1982 and
until 1985 real prices dropped considerably, but the increases
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introduced in 1985 imply that the real level in 1985 was higher
than in 1976 for maize, rice and beans (respectively 89, 6 and
82%). There was, therefore, in fact an attempt to increase
incentives to produce these products and the real price was in
all cases higher than in 1976. However, the inflation in 1986
(17%) implies that the real price of these products started to
fall again. In the case of rice the real price in 1986 became
less than (9%) the 1976 level.
For groundnuts the nominal increase in 1985 was small and
the real price of this crop consequently shows a very negative
trend between 1976 and 1986.
The stability or small increases for all food crops until
1980-1981 in real prices did not continue during the following
years. with the appearance of inflation at large scale real
prlces started to show different fluctuations. Given that no
conscious decisions were taken to change the relations between
the four crops this is an indication that the administrative-
analytic capacity was not able to react adequately to the new
conditions through annual price reviews.
3.2.2. Industrial Crops
Table 2 and figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 in Annex 1
development of nominal and real producer prices
sunflower, copra and cashew which are industrial
require substantial processing.
indicate the
for cotton,
crops which
It is once more noted that nominal prices remained stable
for periods of 2 to 5 years which implies important drops in real
prices from 1981 when the inflation started to increase. In the
case of cotton, sunflower and copra the drops in real prices
during the 1976-86 period are respectively 38, 33 and 47%. For
cashew the drop is more limited, a little more than 11% during
the same period.
It is therefore indisputable that Government reduced
considerably the price incentive to produce industrial crop with
export potential. This fact is in contrast with the priority
which the Government during the whole post-Independence period
officially attributed to these crops. The increases introduced in
nominal prices were, in other words, insufficient to
counterbalance inflation.
It is interesting to observe that these tendencies developed
with an official exchange rate which only fell a little from
1980-81. If producer prices had been linked to a more realistic
exchange rate the above mentioned trends would have been more in
favour of the producers (as is the case for maize and beans).
That is, the producers of industrial export crops could have been
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incentivated more if the exchange rate had been lower and the
additional export income (measured in local currency) had been
used to increase producer prices.
It is therefore clear that the policy followed implies a
hidden producer tax, a fact which benefitted the Government
budget but did not reflect the officially declared policy. This
once more points at the hypothesis that the weak administrative-
analytic capacity was an important constraint.
3.2.3. Agricultural Marketing
Table 3 and figures 13 and 14 in Annex 1 show the marketing
of food and industrial crops during the 1976-86 period. It is
convenient to continue distinguishing between these two groups
for two reasons:
- In the case of food crops there are possibilities for
black markets when official prices do not correspond to
local prices of demand and supply. Agricom buys on the one
hand directly from the peasants and on the other hand from
private or cooperative traders who work at local level. In
the case of state farms Agricom only enters if necessary.
- In the case of industrial crops there are
possibilities for black markets. The crop
directly for processing or through Agricom.
not the
either
same
goes
That is market control is better for industrial crops than
for food crops.
In the circumstances of Mozambique it is difficult to
analyse the relationship between prices and marketing. A large
number of exogenous factors exist. However, an analysis of trends
confirms that it is still worth while to review this topic.
As may be seen in Annex 2 (or by comparing the relevant
figures and tables on marketing and prices in Annex 1) there is
an interesting relationship between prices and marketing for food
crops from 1980-81 to 1984-85 when account is taken of the 1983
drought. Before 1980 the marketing system was still very weak and
in addition there were the 1977-78 floods. In the 1985-86 years
the effects of the war complicates the analysis.
For the industrial crops there is also a similar trend
between price and marketing during the period from 1980-81 to
1984-85. In the case of cotton the difficulties of the marketing
system after Independence were not as important as for the food
crops, cashew and copra because the ginneries had their own
procurement systems. In the 1985-86 period the marketing
increased although real prices diminished, probably a reflection
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of the special buying campaigns which included the supply of
consumer goods.
That is, there is an interesting relationship between prices
and marketing, in particular in the middle of the period under
study, and the contradictions observed in the beginning and in
the end of the period have, in general, obvious explanations
based on exogenous factors. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude that prices are important, but that other factors such
as war, availability of consumer goods and the efficiency of the
marketing network also condition the marketing results. In other
words, it appears that an adequate price policy is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition for realizing marketing objectives.
3.2.4. Exports
Tables 4 and 5 in Annex 1 indicate volume, total value and
unit export values for copra, cashew and cotton fibre. The
decrease in volume is impressive, in particular since 1983. The
level achieved in 1986 in comparison with 1976 was 28% for copra,
15% for cashew and 5% in the case of cotton21
Nominal unit values fluctuate considerably during the whole
period and table 4 in Annex I also indicates a comparison between
these values and nominal producer prices. It is clear that the
Government is taxing exports, in particular in the case of
cashew, because processing costs amount to less than the
difference observed. However, it is also clear that producers
during the whole period received a share (of the value obtained
in the international market) which is of the same order of
magnitude although of course affected in anyone specific year by
fluctuations in the international prices. If the fact that the
"real" value of the Metical decreased is taken into account it
may be concluded that the Government gradually increased its
relative share of "real" exports (through a "hidden tax") .
3.3. Consumer Prices
Table 1 and figure 1 and 2 in Annex 1 show the striking
stability of nominal consumer prices for maize and rice in Maputo
and Beira. There were small increases for these two products in
1980 and 1982, but real prices in these two cities were only
21 The reason of utilizing unit values in Meticais is that
this refects what Mozambique in fact receives in the
international market, and takes into account the possible
difference between the average international price in a given
year and the price Mozambique is capable of obtaining for its
products.
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respectively 58 and 36% of the level in 1976. This is a notable
development and appears directly linked to the availability of
cereal food aid (and the indirect subsidies this implies22 ),
because the real producer price of maize also increased
sUbstantially (and in the case of rice the drop was small).
The above mentioned observations may also be compared with
the fact that real consumer prices for beans and groundnut
dropped much less, but were less stable. Real prices were in 1986
approximately 80% of the real prices of respectively beans and
groundnut in 1979 and 1976.
3.4. Producer Prices and Salaries
After a period with non-controlled increases in salaries
between 1975 and 1979 nominal salaries were fixed in accordance
with the decree 4/80. with the labour law of 1985 some
flexibility was introduced linking salaries to increases in
productivity etc. However, it is difficult to estimate the
average salary due to inexistence of data about the total number
of workers.
Yet, based on the number of salaried workers of 891200 in
accordance with the Census of 198023 , an estimated number in 1986
of 650000 and information on the salary fund, the average monthly
nominal salary may be estimated at Mt 2890 in 1980 and at Mt 5420
in 1986. This implies that the real wage dropped approximately
40% between 1980 and 198624 .
This drop is higher than
real prices of the food
approximately the same order
prices of export crops.
the fall during the same period in
crops considered here, but of
of magnitude as the drop in real
23
22 Direct unit subsidies for maize meal and dehusked rice
were maintained at low levels until 1985 when they increased
sUbstantially. The sUbsidy for dehusked rice, for example,
increased in Maputo from 3.00 Mt/kg to 20.90 Mt/kg and for maize
meal (also in this city) it increased from 3.00 Mt/kg to 8.30 Mt/kg.
See ONE (1980).
24 utilizing the consumer price index (with base in 1975)
which was 107 in 1980 and 325 in 1986 real monthly salaries were
Mt 2700 in 1980 and Mt 1670 in 1986.
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3.5 Summary and. Conclusions
In summary it has been observed that between 1976 and 1986:
- Nominal producer prices remained stable at national level
for very long periods (up to 5 years). Increases were
introduced in jumps which afterwards were gradually affected
by inflation, in particular from 1980-81.
- Real producer prices of food crops increased considerably
in the case of maize and beans, but decreased a little for
rice and considerably for groundnut. For all industrial
crops there were considerable real price decreases.
- It is difficult to identify a straight forward
relationship between producer prices and agricultural
marketing, but there are interestingly similar tendencies,
in particular in the middle of the period under study.
- Although producers maintained their relative share of unit
export values Government increased its "real" tax through
the overvaluation of the Metical.
- Consumer prices were even more stable than producer
prices, in particular for maize and rice, and substantial
sUbsidies, partly based on food aid, were introduced.
- Real salaries decreased a lot between 1980 and 1986. In
fact they decreased more than real producer prices of food
crops. In comparison with real producer prices for
industrial crops the decrease was of the same order of
magnitude.
That is, the consumers (in main urban centers) definitely
benefitted from low food prices and the Government could have
benefitted producers through a devaluation of the Metical
(increasing at the same time the producer prices). However, at
the same time the producers received real prices for maize and
beans which increased sUbstantially and the decrease for rice was
small. In addition, the development of real producer prices of
food crops was better than the development in real average
salary, and for real producer prices of industrial crops the
development was more or less of the same magnitude. It is in this
context interesting to note that global consumption during the
1981-86 years was higher than GDP. That is, the policy followed
was not a policy "on the back of the peasants", it was a
situation where more was consumed than what was produced.
The price policy is not the "only factor that counts".
Getting the prices right is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition, and liberalization cannot by itself put the economic
mechanisms to work. Availability of consumer goods, inputs and
26
efficient marketing systems etc. are also necessary.
Finally it may be concluded that the necessary capacity to
undertake annual price reviews did not exist, a fact which became
important when inflation started to increase. This lack of
administrative-analytic capacity may also explain aspects which
are otherwise difficult to understand such as for example the
pronounced decrease in real producer prices for groundnut.
4. MAIN TOPICS AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
4.1. Presentation
This chapter presents the main considerations to take into
account in price policy formulation as well as proposals for
future development of work in this area of the agricultural
sector in Mozambique.
The price policy has as its point of departure the political
and economic system of the country and the development objectives
defined by the Party and the Government. As such the formulation
of the price policy has to take into consideration the importance
of achieving food selfsUfficiency , the importance of generating
exports and gaining foreign currency, the distribution of
national income, nutritional aspects, the introduction of new
technologies and the development of the agroindustrial sector
etc. That is, the price policy has to be continously adjusted to
new priorities and conditions existing in the country as well as
in the international market.
4.2. Main Considerations
Among the main considerations to be taken into consideration
in formUlating the price policy the following can be mentioned:
- There is a conflict between the interests of the consumer
and those of the producer. The producers need to cover their
costs and generally want high prices as an incentive to
produce, and consumers want low prices so they can better
satisfy their consumption needs. Between these two levels
there are economic agents in the sectors for processing and
distribution who also have their interest in obtaining
reasonable margins. These conflicts cannot in the present
phase be avoided in Mozambique where the problem of
production is a contraint in the economic life of the
country. It is therefore better to recognize this conflict
and consider it in price policy formulation.
- Price policy formulation cannot be seen isolated from the
macroeconomic policies pursued in general. The budget policy
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affect the balance between supply and demand in the economy
and therefore the framework within which the price policy is
defined; the exchange rate policy has an important impact on
the income of export crop producers and on the cost of
imported goods and inputs; the tax and sUbsidy policy affect
the price system as is the case with consumer, value added
and export taxes, and it is obvious that transport tariffs
affect the possibilities of the private sector to assume a
role in marketing; the investment and technology policy
imply limits within which prices must develop; the wage
policy affects demand etc. It is therefore necessary to take
these factors explicitly into account in price policy
formulation.
- The structure of production and the system of marketing is
intimately linked to the possibilities of the Government to
implement in practice its price policy. Who produces and
with what technology are important aspects. Tea is a product
grown exclusively in the state sector where the price of raw
material as such is irrelevant; but in the case of cotton
the producer price of seed cotton produced in the family
sector is of fundamental importance in ensuring a supply of
raw material. The majority of the food crops require little
processing contrary to many export crops which require
substantial processing. One may for example compare beans
and cotton. Export crops must be sold at international
market prices; this is not necessarily so for products for
internal consumption, although there may be opportunity
costs which should be considered.
- The institutional capacity for analysis and implementation
of the price policy is a limiting factor in many countries.
It is complex to analyse this area of economics and it is
necessary to have data and up-to-date information covering
all relevant aspects. Similarly, implementation requires
administrative capacity at all levels. It might for example
be desired for efficiency reasons to establish prices at
provincial rather than at national level. But this requires
more information about transport costs and more
administrative resources. Annual price reviews may also be
useful, but require the necessary capacity. The utilization
of just one crop model for each crop ignores sUbstantial
differences in technology and costs of production. However,
to establish differentiated prices implies a heavy work load
in studying and defining models by for example social sector
and region of the country. Therefore, the implementation of
the desired price policy is not necessarily possible in
practice. This implies a need to assess other ways of
realizing established objectives. Geographical
differentiation may, for example, be more important than
trying to establish prices at all levels between production
and consumption. The efficient control of a small number of
28
strategic crops could possibly have a more effective impact
than controlling superficially a large range of products.
4.3. Liberalization and Intervention in the Price structure
A number of developing countries with central planning
systems are introducing reforms in the area of price policy and
in the functioning of marketing systems. Reference may be made,
for example, to China, Vietnam and Cuba. Although measures are
different it is characteristic that there is an attempt to
promote local initiative and increase the flexibility in the
structure of prices and markets. In the case of Mozambique this
process also started and reference was already made to the
demands of the IMF and WB and the measures in PRE.
However, it is important to clarify what liberalizing means.
Does it mean absolutely no intervention by Government in price
formation? Or does it mean intervention with more flexibility?
And finally how should new measures be introduced in this area?
The argument of liberalizing completely agricultural prices
is normally based on the suggestion that it is the most efficient
and that the State may always intervene through the use of income
transfers as a measure to ensure the desired income distribution.
However, this model and its assumptions are far from the reality
of a country like Mozambique and it has already been mentioned
that there is no country in the World which does not one way or
the other intervene in relation to the agricultural prices. It is
a common experience that the state cannot achieve socio-economic
objectives as selfsUfficiency in food and export promotion
without intervention. It would therefore seem that this issue
should be analysed product by product taking into consideration
the differences already observed among the various products and
their relative importance in the national economy. The products
are reviewed below by degree of Government intervention, starting
with those where limited Government intervention seems
relevant25 .
4.3.1. Minimum Intervention
The Government already liberalized the fruits and vegetable
market and this is in fact a case where minimum intervention
arguments has weight. The production is undertaken in a large
number of small fields around the consumption centres. The
products are easily destroyed and quick distribution is therefore
25 In what follows the analysis is not limited to the
eight crops analysed in section 3, but it is stressed that
livestock and forestry products were not included here.
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essential. The role of a large number of individual sellers and
traders is important and create competition and efficiency. It is
finally very complex to intervene without creating undesired
trouble as black markets etc. For an analysis of the results of
the liberalization implemented in this field reference is made to
the studies made in collaboration between the Government and the
WB (Larson, 1987). In the case of exported fruits such as citrus
the export price is given by the international market. The
producer price should therefore have a direct relationship with
this price.
In the case of products such as tea and sisal which require
processing before their utilization it is irrelevant for
Mozambique to fix producer prices. The whole production process
is under control of agroindustrial complexes where the production
of raw material is only the first element in a chain of
vertically integrated activities where it is only the final price
which is directly relevant. This situation may be compared with a
case where the raw material (tea leaves for example) is produced
by smallholders who sell to the processing factories and where
the producer price assumes relevance.
In the case of the above three products which are also
7xported it is rel7vant to consider international prices if there1S intervention 1n the consumer price. For tea and sisal
Government could fix consumer prices but it could also leave the
processors with this task without loosing control if marketing
margins (as for example those in DL 6/73) are used. Technically
the same procedure could be used for sugar, but here it must be
noted that the internal production costs are very much higher
than the international level. Therefore, consumer prices based on
internal costs of production would be equivalent to a high
consumer tax on this product which has big importance for the
consumers. In the short run this measure does not, therefore,
seem viable, but it is indispensable to increase efficiency of
production in the longer run to equilibrate the situation.
4.3.2. Maximum Intervention
The Government has given strategic importance to urban food
supplies and the generation of foreign exchange. It would
therefore be difficult to avoid maximum intervention in the
prices of maize, rice and cotton.
Maize and rice are basic products in the diet and Government
has to assure a minimum supply of these products under normal
circumstances as well as in cases of natural calamities etc. That
is, these products have the highest priority.
It must be stressed though that Government does not
necessarily have to fix the producer prices. Minimum prices could
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be considered, but in this case it is important that Government
recognizes that consumer prices could fluctuate substantially
between years of high and years of low production. If these
fluctuations are not acceptable Government must fix the prices
and/or subsidize prices at consumer level (if the necessary funds
or food aid is available for this objective).
It is in all cases relevant to consider if it is really
necessary to fix the prices at all levels to maintain central
control, or whether it is not possible to fix less prices and
introduce more flexibility with the utilization of given
marketing margins, for example. It would probably be sufficient
to publish only the producer and consumer prices basing the
difference between them on realistic estimates of marketing
costs.
Cotton is a crop which is very intensive in terms of manual
labour and purchased inputs, and competes directly with food
crops like maize. In addition, cotton is a strategic foreign
exchange earner. It is therefore difficult to avoid maximum
intervention (fixed or minimum price) in the producer price of
seed cotton, because the instability following a liberalization
would be inacceptable. However, for cotton fibre, prices
negotiated between the ginneries and the textile industry could
be introduced without difficulty considering that the majority of
the production is exported.
That is, although it may be difficult to liberalize the
prices of maize, rice and cotton more flexibility can be
introduced. In all cases annual price reviews and margins based
on appropriate crop models for the various social sectors will be
necessary, analysing as well other factors such as production and
marketing.
4.3.3. Medium Intervention
There is a big number of crops where the degree of
intervention is more difficult to establish. In the first place
there are two industrial crops, cashew and copra, which are
exported and in the case of copra also serves as raw material for
the oil industry. other oil crops 1 ike sunflower, mafurra and
sesame may also be included in this group.
In the case of liberalizing the prices of these crops it
would be reasonable to expect that processors would continue to
use existing prices in a first phase. Real prices are at the
moment so low that it would not be viable for the processors to
lower the prices further without having a strong impact on the
supply side.
In the medium term it is clear that there are possibilities
for some processors to use their monopolistic position in a given
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region. This possibility is more pronounced in the North where
there are fewer factories, but considering the low degree of
utilization of the installed capacity it is very doubtful that
the processor would be able to use their position at the cost of
the producers if they are operating in accordance with commercial
principles. It is in this context also interesting to observe
that there is already a tradition in Mozambique for transporting
raw material from one part of the country to another. That is,
possibilities for competition exist.
In analysing the effects of a possible liberalization of
prices of these products it must also be recalled that the
possibilities for increasing competition from producer to
processor also depend upon the marketing system in direct contact
with the peasants and upon the transport system to the factory.
In the extreme case where Agricom is the only organism which
has in practice possibility to buy products from the peasants,
transport them and sell them to the factory, it is in fact a
situation of maximum intervention. The only possible flexibility
which may be introduced in this kind of situation would be
minimum prices or the utilization of fixed marketing margins,
instead of fixed prices at all levels of the chain, possibly also
introducing factory gate prices negotiated between Agricom on the
one side and the processors on the other. This last flexibility
can only be introduced if the effects on the consumers of edible
oils are accepted by the state.
If in practice the state ensures viable competition among
Agricom and the private traders at local level, guaranteeing for
example access to means of transport at reasonable prices, there
are possibilities for a situation where state intervention in the
price formation may be established at the desired level. The
state could leave the establishment of equilibrium prices to
demand and supply of edible oils; and only intervene if the
consequences from a production or consumption point of view were
unsatisfactory. If there is need to intervene, the most efficient
means would seem to be minimum producer prices combined with
maximum marketing and processing margins.
As regards copra which can also be exported it must be
recalled that international prices will have an impact on the
internal price formation.
In the case of cashew which is an important export
commodity, the considerations of the possible effects of
liberalizing prices are very similar. The degree of utilization
of the industrial capacity is so low that it is unreasonable to
expect that the factories would use monopolistic possibilities.
These possibilities are in any case counterbalanced by an
eventual transport of raw material to other more distant
factories. However, without competition at the local level of
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marketing and in the transport the situation is comparable with
maximum intervention. In the case where various competing traders
exist it is possible to liberalize the prices leaving their
definition to market forces where the impact of international
prices would be determining. Liberalization would in the case of
cashew have a very positive impact in what concerns the
differentiation among the various qualities of this product,
which is very easy when it is done at processing level. The
degree of state intervention would in this case depend upon an
appreciation of the relative importance of the need to increase
production and exports, or the income of the Government.
Another group includes cassava, beans, groundnut, sorghum,
potato and wheat. They are crops where the Government in
principle could intervene in the price formation with a view to
improve nutrition and selfsUfficiency in food. That is, these
crops are in this context comparable with maize and rice and are
clearly distinct from for example fruits and vegetables. However,
considering the present low level of marketing, they are not
strategic crops in the same sense as maize and rice, and it
appears reasonable to avoid for the time being Government
intervention in these cases.
Tobacco serves, as the oil crops, as raw material for the
national industry. If the Government wishes to promote family
sector production it would probably be necessary for the state to
intervene in producer price formation given that there are only
two processors which have an oligopolistic position. However, at
present the raw material is produced by the state sector which
has capacity to negotiate its price with the industry. The need
to intervene at this. level does not therefore exist at the
moment. The only case where the Government has to intervene is if
the final price of tobacco products is unacceptable at consumer
level. This possibility should probably be given little weight
given that these products are not that important. In the case of
export of tobacco the situation is comparable to that the tea.
4.4. Conclusions and Proposals
considering the limited institutional capacity and the lack
of data and information in the field of price formulation it
seems reasonable to limit the Government intervention in price
formation to a small number of crops instead of the large number
included in the past. The choice of crops must be based on two
considerations: The importance of the crop and the production and
market structure, which determines whether intervention would in
fact be effective.
On the basis of the above analysis it is proposed that
maximum intervention is considered in the case of maize, rice and
cotton only. The introduction of minimum prices instead of fixed
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producer prices could also be considered, but it seems advisable
to fix prices for the time being, to maintain a maximum of
possibility to use the price as an incentive to production26 .
However, it is advisable to leave fixing prices at all
intermediate levels fixing only the consumer price (or the
factory gate price) in addition to the producer price.
In relation to other products such as fruits, vegetables,
tea, sugar and sisal minimum intervention is advisable either
because these are export crops or because of the characteristics
of the production and marketing system.
For the crops in the intermediate group liberalization could
in fact be introduced without loosing effective control of the
economy and without having negative effects on the supply.
Minimum producer prices could be established as a guarantee
against excessive price drops (in particular for export crops
where this risk is big), and also maximum consumer prices could
be considered. In all cases, fixing of intermediate prices could
be left.
It must be stressed, however, that a fundamental assumption
in leaving the fixing of intermediate prices (or establish
marketing margins) is that there exists in practice a certain
degree of competition among traders and processors. If not, they
will have possibilities for using monopolistic situations. The
Government policy towards access to transport means is in this
context very important. If it is decided to establish minimum
prices it is indispensable that Agricom has a market information
system and sufficient capacity to act when necessary.
In the case where the state intervenes directly in the
formation of prices, detailed information on production systems
and relative costs of the various crops including transport and
processing costs as well, is indispensable. It must be stressed
that peasants in the family sector grow various crops which are
in fact in competition one with the others in relation to factors
of production including in particular manual labour. Any advance
in the area of price intervention would be impossible without
better knOWledge of these fundamental aspects, and this is in
fact a strong argument for focussing on maize, rice and cotton
leaving considerations as to the introduction of minimum prices
for other crops to a future phase, with possible exception of
minimum prices for export products like cashew and copra.
It is important to regionalize producer prices as soon
as possible to increase economic efficiency, but it must once
more be stressed that this should not be exaggerated as this
would create other inflexibilities in the price and
marketing system. Only big regions which are fundamentally
different should be considered.
34
ANNEX 1
Tables and Figures with Reference to Price Developments
between
1976 and 1986
Page
Table 1 Price Development of Food Crops 36
Figure 1 : Nominal Prices: Maize 37
2 Nominal Prices: Rice 38
3 Nominal Prices: Beans 39
4 Nominal Prices: Groundnut 40
5 Real Prices: Maize 41
6 Real Prices: Rice 42
7 Real Prices: Beans 43
8 Real Prices: Groundnut 44
Table 2 Price Development for Industrial Crops 45
Figure 9 Producer Prices: Cotton 46
10 Producer Prices: Sunflower 47
11 Producer Prices: Copra 48
12 Producer Prices: Cashew 49
Table 3 Agricultural Marketing 50
Figure 13 : Marketing of Food Crops 51
14 : Marketing of Industrial Crops 52
Table 4 Relationship between Producer Prices
and Export Values 53
Table 5 : Export of Agricultural Products 54
35
TABLE 1: PRICE DEVELOPMENTS Of fOOD CROPS: 1976 - 1987 a)
(escudos, meticais/kg)
Year 1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Producer Prises
Maize nominal 2.50 3.20 3.20 3.20 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 13.00 13.00
real 2.48 3.11 3.08 3.02 3.74 3.67 4.65 3.64 2.78 4.68 4.00
Rice nominal 5.50 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 10.00 10.00 10.00 16.00 16.00
real 5.45 6.02 5.96 5.85 5.79 5.69 7.TS 6.06 4.63 5.76 4.92
\Jheat nominal 4.40 4.40 4.40 ~.~o ~.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.~0 11.50 11.50
real ~.36 ~.27 4.23 4.15 4.11 ~.04 3.~1 2.67 2.04 ~.14 3.54
Sorgl'll.ITI nominal 2.30 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 ~.oo 5.00 5.00 5.00 12.00 12.00
real 2.28 2.91 2.88 2.83 2.80 3.67 3.88 3.03 2.31 4.32 3.69
Cassava nominal n/a n/a n/a 3.50 2.00 3.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 free free
dry real 3.30 1.87 2.15 3.49 2.73 2.08
Beans nominal 6.50 10.00 10.00 11.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 23.50 23.50
type 1 real 6.« 9.71 9.62 10.38 14.02 13.76 11.63 9.09 6.94 8.45 7.23
Beans nominal 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 15.00 15.00
type 2 real 2.97 4.85 4.81 4.72 4.67 6.88 5.81 4.55 3.47 5.40 4.62
Groundnut nominal 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 13.50 15.00 15.00 15.00 20.00 20.00
reaL 8.~2 9.71 9.62 9.43 9.35 12.39 11.63 9.09 6.94 7.19 6.15
ConslIfIer Prices
Maize nominal 4.83 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
real 4.78 4.85 ~.81 ~.72 6.54 6.42 6.98 5.45 ~.17 3.24 2.n
Rice nominal 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 13.50 13.50 13.50 13.50 13.50
real 11.39 11. 17 11.06 10.85 10.TS 10.55 10.~7 8.18 6.25 4.86 ~. 15
Sorghun nominal n/a nla n/a 5.50 5.50 7.00 8.50 8.50 8.50 16.50 16.50
real 5.19 5.14 6.42 6.59 5.15 3.94 5.94 5.08
Cassava nominal nla n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 free free
dry real 7.80 7.TS 6.06 4.63
Beans nominal n/a n/a n/a 18.00 27.50 27.50 27.50 27.50 27.50 34.50 34.50
type 1 resl 16.98 25.70 25.23 21.32 16.67 12.73 12.41 10.62
Beans nominal n/a nla n/a 10.00 10.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 24.00 24.00
type 2 real 9.43 9.35 12.84 10.85 8.48 6.48 8.63 7.38
Grouncfnut nominaL 12.00 13.50 13.50 18.50 20.00 24.50 26.50 26.50 26.50 30.50 30.50
reel 11.88 13.11 12.98 17.45 18.69 22.48 20.54 16.06 12.27 10.97 9.38
ConsU'Iler Price Index 101 103 104 106 107 109 129 165 216 278 325
in RPM (1915=100)
Sources: AGRICOM, CNSP. SEA
Wotes: a) To calculate reat prices, nominal prices were deflated with the consumer price index;
in general prices to use in southern ~ozamb;que are shown.
b) Prices to use in Maputo and Beira; prices in other areas: 1985 1986 1987
maize 17.50 17.50 30.00
rice 35.00 35.00 60.00
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Figure 1
Nominal Prices: Maize
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Figure 3
Nominal Prices: Beans (type 2)
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Figure 4
Nominal Prices: Groundnut
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Figure 5
Real Prices: Maize
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Figure 6
Real Prices: Rice
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Figure 7
Real Pric es: Beans (type 2)
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Figure 8
Reol Prices: Groundnut
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TASlE 2: PRICE DEVELOPMENTS FOR INDUSTRIAL CROPS: '976 ~ '987
.)
(escudos, meticals/kg)
Year 1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981 W82 1983 1984 1985 1966 1987Producer Price
Sunflower nominal 7.00 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 15.00 15.00 50.00real 6.93 8.25 8.17 8.02 7.94 7.80 8.14 6.36 4.66 5.40 4.62
Sessme nomi na l nIB , 1.00 11.00 '1.00 11.00 11.00 13.50 13.50 13.50 19.50 19.50 100.00real 10.68 10.58 10.38 10.28 10.09 '0.47 8.18 6.25 7.01 6.00
Mdurra nominal 2.20 2.20 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 30.00real 2.18 2.14 2.88 2.83 2.80 2.75 3.88 3.03 2.31 2.88 2.46
Copr. nominal 3.20 4.70 4.80 4.85 4.85 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.50 5.50 5.50 18.00real 3.17 4.56 4.62 4.58 4.53 4.59 3.88 3.03 2.55 1.98 1.69
Cashew nominal 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 60.00Nut real 3.47 3.40 3.37 3.30 4.67 4.59 3.88 3.03 4.63 3.60 3.08
Seed nominal b) 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 12.50 12.50 16.00 16.00 65.00Cotton real 7.92 7.77 7.69 7.55 10.28 10.09 8.53 7.58 5.79 5.76 4.92
Prices at Factory Gate/Yarehouse
Sunflower nominal 8.37 10.70 10.70 10.90 10.90 10.90 12.90 12.90 12.90 16.50 16.50 60.00real 8.29 10.39 10.29 10.28 10.19 10.00 10.00 7.82 5.97 5.94 5.08
Sesame nominel nt. 13.40 13.40 13.40 13.40 13.40 17.80 17.80 17.80 22.00 22.00 118.00real 13.01 12.88 12.64 12.52 12.29 13.80 10.79 8.24 7.91 6.n
Hafurra nominal 3.30 3.30 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 12.00 12.00 48.00real 3.27 3.20 4.33 4.25 4.21 4.13 5.04 3.94 3.01 4.32 3.69
Copra nominal 4.40 6.00 6.10 6.20 6.20 6.70 6.70 6.70 7.50 7.50 7.50 25.00real 4.36 5.83 5.87 5.85 5.79 6.15 5.19 4.06 3.47 2.70 2.31
Cashew nominal nIB 6.60 4.80 4.80 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 13.20 13.20 13.20 86.00real 6.41 4.62 4.53 7.01 6.88 5.81 4.55 6.11 4.75 4.06
Cotton nominal c) 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 285.00Fibre real 49.50 48.54 48.08 47.17 46.73 45.87 38.76 30.30 23.15 17.99 15.38
Consuner Price Index 101 103 104 106 107 109 129 165 216 278 325 325in RPM
<1975=100)
Sources: AGRICOH. CNSP, SEA
Notes: a) To calculate real prices, nomin~1 prices were deflated with the consumer price fndeK;
in gener.l prices to use in southern Hoz.mbique are shown.
b) First quality.
c) Type 1 national tndustry.
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Figure 9
Producer Prices: Cotton
1976 - 1986
1986198519841983198219811980197919781977
20 .,-----------------------------,
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8f==='!!==4'==:'Y
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0+---r-'-----,--.------.-----,---,--------,----r---,---------1
1976
u
•w
o Nomina) Price
Year
+ Real Price
46
Figure 10
Producer Prices: Sunflower
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Figure 11
Producer Prices: Copra
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Fi gure 12
Produc er Pric es: Cashew
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TABLE 3: AGRICULTURAL MARKETING: 1976 . 1986
(000 tomes)
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1954 1985 1986
Food Crops
Haize 90.0 34.0 70.0 66.0 65.0 78.3 86.2 55.8 82.6 58.6 21.5
Rice 75.0 60.0 44.0 56.3 43.6 28.9 41.5 17.3 19.1 17.9 19.0
\/heat n/a nI. nla nI. 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0
Sorgtn.J'll nIB nIB nIB nIB 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.8 0.6
Cassava (dry) n/a n/a n/a nIB 8.8 10.9 9.5 8.5 6.9 6.4 6.0
Beans 14.0 14.0 10.1 13.0 9.6 14.9 6.9 4.8 3.5 3.6 2.8
Grourdnuts nIB nIB nIB nIB 6.3 5.0 1.5 0.7 2.0 2.0 0.9
Vegetables 3.0 2.0 6.0 2.3 6.4 6.8 5.6 7.9 20.0 33.9 23.9
-Industrial Crops
Sunflower 7.0 10.0 7.0 4.8 11.8 12.1 10.8 7.3 5.0 5.7 1.0
Ses8lTle n/a n/a nIB nIB 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
Hafurra n/a n/a nIB nIB 0.0 3.8 6.4 5.7 5.3 2.6 2.2
Copra 72.0 48.0 60.0 51.0 37.1 54.4 36.6 30.7 24.8 24.0 28.6
Casl'lew 120.0 102.0 90.0 62.6 87.6 90.1 57.0 18.1 25.3 30.4 40.1
Seed Cotton 36.8 52.0 72.4 36.8 64.9 73.7 60.7 24.7 19.7 5.7 10.8
Tea (leaf) 67.3 77.3 67.6 86.0 90.2 99.2 109.7 51.1 59.8 25.0 6.4
Sisal ( l.aO 325.0 325.0 375.0 424.1 298.0 233.8 139.9 122.4 136.6 78.8 22.4
Citrus 30.0 25.0 38.6 39.0 37.3 36.7 38.1 33.5 24.6 31.5 20.2
Source: ONE (1987)
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Figure 13
Marketing of Food Crops
1976 - 1986
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Figure 14
Marketing of Industrial Crops
1975 - 1985
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TARLE 4: RELATIONSHIP BET~EN PRODUCER PRICES AND EXPORT VALUES 1976 • 1986
(meticais/kg, percentage)
Yeef 1976 1977 1976 1979 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1986
Copra nominal price 3.20 4.70 4.60 4.65 4.65 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.50 5.50 5.50
unit value 5.17 9.17 12.11 19.96 15.32 14.16 9.13 14.47 16.61 17.26 7.22
price/value X 62 51 40 24 32 35 55 35 29 32 76
Cashew nominal price 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
nut unit value 49.72 86.34 76.14 64.53 134.72 154.92 96.61 111.57 156.54 160.67 217.97
price/value X 7 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 6 6 5
Seed Cotton nominal price 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 '1.00 11.00 11.00 12.50 12.50 16.00 16.00
Cotton F; bre un; t value 32.99 45.79 33.97 47.25 46.75 56.73 47.66 51.63 57.60 49.06 27.75
price/value % 24 17 24 17 24 19 23 24 22 33 56
Source: Tables 2 and 5
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TABLE 5: EXPORT Of AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: 1976 . 1986
(recurrent prices)
(vaLue in million Ht l volume 1000 tannes. unit values Mt/~g)
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Copra value 212.6 334.8 416.6 580.8 297.3 173.0 111.4 86.8 79.0 219.2 84.5
voll.me 41.1 36.5 34.4 29.1 19.4 12.2 12.2 6.0 4.2 12.7 11.7
un. value 5.2 9.2 12.1 20.0 15.3 14.2 9.1 14.5 18.8 17.3 7.2
Copra value 94.4 93.9 40.5 84.3 88.1 94.6 44.7 0.0 0.0 18.1 14.5
Oil votune 8.6 5.3 1.9 3.1 3.6 4.8 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
un. value 11.0 17.7 21.3 27.2 24.5 19.7 17.9 0.0 0.0 30.2 29.0
Cashew value 1049.0 1467.7 1437.8 1445.5 2101.6 1890.0 1646.8 647.1 650.0 498.7 675.7
Nut volure 21.1 17.0 18.4 17.1 15.6 12.2 16.7 5.8 4.1 3.1 3.1
un. value 49.7 86.3 78.1 84.5 134.7 154.9 98.6 111.6 158.5 160.9 218.0
Cashew value 44.4 81.2 181.1 267.7 60.3 65.0 32.9 14.8 5.9 13.2 12.1
Oil voll.lOe 8.3 10.0 7.9 6.3 2.0 4.8 7.1 3.0 0.7 1.0 1.0
un. value 5.3 8.1 22.9 42.5 30.2 13.5 4.6 4.9 8.4 13.2 12.1
Cotton value 537.8 288.5 434.8 760.7 266.5 881.0 652.9 684.2 341.0 230.6 22.2
Fibre volume 16.3 6.3 12.8 16.1 5.7 15.0 13.7 13.2 5.9 4.7 0.8
un. value 33.0 45.8 34.0 47.2 46.8 58.7 47.7 51.8 57.8 49.1 27.7
Tea vaLue 199.8 409.6 407.5 680.1 938.0 502.0 969.8 591.2 458.2 104.2 50.8
volume 12.7 12.3 13.5 23.3 30.0 16.0 25.1 13.3 7.7 1.8 1.5
un. value 15.7 33.3 30.2 29.2 31.3 31.4 38.6 44.5 59.5 57.9 33.9
Sugar velue 536.9 260.1 182.0 951.7 797.0 888.0 331.8 346.4 244.2 294.6 326.3
volume 71.9 37.4 24.6 118.7 63.8 63.1 28.5 25.0 16.4 16.8 19.5
un. value 7.5 7.0 7.4 8.0 12.5 14.1 11.6 13.9 14.9 17.5 16.7
Sisal value 81.5 137.7 . 137.3 197.4 129.1 103.0 100.1 37.9 33.0 4.1 0.1
volume 10.1 13.9 11.3 14.0 7.0 5.8 5.7 2.5 2.0 0.2 nla
l.Xl. value 8.1 9.9 12.2 14.1 18.4 17.8 17.6 15.2 16.5 20.5 nla
Citrus value 35.3 15.5 40.0 68.2 83.8 170.0 100.0 79.7 137.2 132.5 89.2
volume 8.7 3.4 11.8 16.3 14.0 16.5 11.6 8.0 11.0 10.4 8.3
un. value 4.1 4.6 3.4 4.2 6.0 10.3 8.6 10.0 12.5 12.7 10.7
Source: ONE (1987)
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ANNEX 2
Figures with Reference to Analysis of Marketing
and Real Producer Price Trends
between 1976 and 1986
Page
Figure 1 Maize 56
2 Rice 57
3 Beans 58
4 Groundnut 59
5 Cotton 60
6 Sunflower 61
7 Copra 62
8 Cashew 63
Note: For clarity in the exposition cashew, copra and maize
prices were multiplied with 10 and rice and cotton prices with 5.
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Figure 5
Cotton
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Figure 6
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Copra
80 ~-----------------------------~
70
60
50
40
30
20
1986198519841983198219811980197919781977
10 -I---~---,----,---~--~-~-----.-----,------r----1
1976
o Marketing + Real Prices
62
Figure 8
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